A systematic review of the relationship between emotion and susceptibility to misinformation.

Inaccurate memory reports can have serious consequences within forensic and clinical settings, where emotion and misinformation are two common sources of memory distortion. Many studies have investigated how these factors are related; does emotion protect memory or leave it more vulnerable to the distorting effects of misinformation? The findings remain diffused. Thus, the present review aimed to clarify the relationship between emotion and susceptibility to misinformation. 39 eligible studies were reviewed. Results varied according to the type and dimension of emotion measured. Level of arousal may be unrelated to susceptibility to misinformation when retrieval occurs without delay; studies including delayed retrieval were limited. Stimuli valence may be associated with increased susceptibility to peripheral misinformation but unrelated to other misinformation. The following results were reported by limited studies: short-term distress and moderate levels of stress may decrease susceptibility, while anger and greater cortisol response to stress may increase susceptibility to misinformation. Source memory may also be unaffected by emotion. The results have important potential implications for forensic and clinical practice, for example by highlighting the value of enquiring witnesses' source memory. Methodological recommendations for future studies are made.

The effect of cross-examination style questions on adult eyewitness accuracy depends on question type and eyewitness confidence.

In adversarial legal systems across the world, witnesses in criminal trials are subjected to cross-examination. The questions that cross-examiners pose to witnesses are often complex and confusing; they might include negatives, double negatives, leading questions, closed questions, either/or questions, or complex syntax and vocabulary. Few psycholegal studies have explored the impact of such questions on the accuracy of adult witnesses' reports. In two experiments, we adapted the standard investigative interview procedure to examine the effect of five types of cross-examination style questions on witness accuracy and confidence. Participants watched a mock crime video and answered simple-style questions about the event. Following a delay, participants answered both cross-examination style questions and simple questions about the event. Negative and Double negative questions sometimes impaired the accuracy of witnesses' responses during cross-examination, whereas Leading and Leading-with-feedback questions did not impair - but sometimes enhanced - the accuracy of witnesses' responses. Participants who were better at discriminating between correct and incorrect responses on the initial memory test were more likely to improve the accuracy of their reports during cross-examination. Our findings suggest that the effect of cross-examination style questions on eyewitness accuracy depends on question type and witnesses' confidence in their responses.

Associations between the misinformation effect, trauma exposure and symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder and depression.

This research aimed to conduct an initial investigation into the relationships between the "misinformation effect" and trauma exposure, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression. Study 1 was a pilot study developing an online misinformation paradigm that could assess the influence of emotion and arousal on memory distortions. Participants (n = 162, Mage = 39.90; SD = 10.90) were recruited through TurkPrime. In Study 2 community members (n = 116, Mage = 28.96; SD = 10.33) completed this misinformation paradigm and measures of trauma exposure, PTSD, and depression. Study 1 found memory for central details was better for high-arousal than low-arousal and neutral-arousal images. Peripheral memory appeared worse for negative and neutral images than positive images. Study 2 found that, when controlling for age and gender, PTSD symptoms significantly predicted proportion of correct responses on control items. However, there was no evidence to indicate that trauma exposure, PTSD symptoms nor depression symptoms, were associated with proportion of correct responses on misled items. Valence and arousal did not influence these associations. These findings have important implications in clinical and legal contexts where individuals with a history of trauma, or who are experiencing symptoms of PTSD or depression, are often required to recall emotionally-laden events. There is a surprising dearth of research into the misinformation effect in clinical populations and further research is required.

Investigating age-related differences in ability to distinguish between original and manipulated images.

Manipulated images can have serious and persistent ramifications across many domains: They have undermined trust in political campaigns, incited fear and violence, and fostered dangerous global movements. Despite growing concern about the power of manipulated images to influence people's beliefs and behavior, few studies have examined whether people can detect manipulations and the psychological processes underpinning this task. We asked 5,291 older adults, 5,291 middle-aged adults, and 5,291 young adults to detect and locate manipulations within images of real-world scenes. To determine whether a simple intervention could improve people's ability to detect manipulations, some participants viewed a short video which described the five common manipulation techniques used in the present study. Overall, participants demonstrated a limited ability to distinguish between original and manipulated images. Older adults were less accurate in detecting and locating manipulations than younger and middle-aged adults, and the effect of age varied by manipulation type. The video intervention improved performance marginally. Participants were often overconfident in their decisions, despite having limited ability to detect manipulations. Older adults were more likely than younger and middle-aged adults to report checking for shadow/lighting inconsistencies, a strategy that was not associated with improved discriminability, and less likely to report using other strategies (e.g., photometric inconsistencies) that were associated with improved discriminability. Differences in strategy use might help to account for the age differences in accuracy. Further research is needed to advance our understanding of the psychological mechanisms underlying image manipulation detection and the myriad factors that may enhance or impair performance. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Disfluent difficulties are not desirable difficulties: the (lack of) effect of Sans Forgetica on memory.

Scientists working at the intersection of cognitive psychology and education have developed theoretically-grounded methods to help people learn. One important yet counterintuitive finding is that making information harder to learn - that is, creating desirable difficulties - benefits learners. Some studies suggest that simply presenting information in a difficult-to-read font could serve as a desirable difficulty and therefore promote learning. To address this possibility, we examined the extent to which Sans Forgetica, a newly developed font, improves memory performance - as the creators of the font claim. Across four experiments, we set out to replicate unpublished findings by the font's creators. Subjects read information in Sans Forgetica or Arial, and rated how difficult the information was to read (Experiment 1) or attempted to recall the information (Experiments 2-4). Although subjects rated Sans Forgetica as being more difficult to read than Arial, Sans Forgetica led to equivalent memory performance, and sometimes even impaired it. These findings suggest that although Sans Forgetica promotes a feeling of disfluency, it does not create a desirable difficulty or benefit memory.

Can people detect errors in shadows and reflections?

The increasing sophistication of photo-editing software means that even amateurs can create compelling doctored images. Yet recent research suggests that people's ability to detect image manipulations is limited. Given the prevalence of manipulated images in the media, on social networking sites, and in other domains, the implications of mistaking a fake image as real, or vice versa, can be serious. In seven experiments, we tested whether people can make use of errors in shadows and reflections to determine whether or not an image has been manipulated. Our results revealed that people's ability to identify authentic and manipulated scenes based on shadow and reflection information increased with the size of the manipulation, but overall, detection rates remained poor. Consistent with theories of incomplete visual representation, one possible reason for these findings could be that people rarely encode the details of scenes that provide useful cues as to the authenticity of images. Overall, our findings indicate that people do not readily make use of shadow and reflection cues to help determine the authenticity of images-yet it remains possible that people could make use of these cues, but they are simply unaware of how to do so.

Detecting morphed passport photos: a training and individual differences approach.

Our reliance on face photos for identity verification is at odds with extensive research which shows that matching pairs of unfamiliar faces is highly prone to error. This process can therefore be exploited by identity fraudsters seeking to deceive ID checkers (e.g., using a stolen passport which contains an image of a similar looking individual to deceive border control officials). In this study we build on previous work which sought to quantify the threat posed by a relatively new type of fraud: morphed passport photos. Participants were initially unaware of the presence of morphs in a series of face photo arrays and were simply asked to detect which images they thought had been digitally manipulated (i.e., "images that didn't look quite right"). All participants then received basic information on morph fraud and rudimentary guidance on how to detect such images, followed by a morph detection training task (Training Group, n = 40), or a non-face control task (Guidance Group, n = 40). Participants also completed a post-guidance/training morph detection task and the Models Face Matching Test (MFMT). Our findings show that baseline morph detection rates were poor, that morph detection training significantly improved the identification of these images over and above basic guidance, and that accuracy in the mismatch condition of the MFMT correlated with morph detection ability. The results are discussed in relation to potential countermeasures for morph-based identity fraud.

Reasons to Doubt the Reliability of Eyewitness Memory: Commentary on Wixted, Mickes, and Fisher (2018).

Wixted, Mickes, and Fisher (this issue) take issue with the common trope that eyewitness memory is inherently unreliable. They draw on a large body of mock-crime research and a small number of field studies, which indicate that high-confidence eyewitness reports are usually accurate, at least when memory is uncontaminated and suitable interviewing procedures are used. We agree with the thrust of Wixted et al.'s argument and welcome their invitation to confront the mass underselling of eyewitnesses' potential reliability. Nevertheless, we argue that there is a comparable risk of overselling eyewitnesses' reliability. Wixted et al.'s reasoning implies that near-pristine conditions or uncontaminated memories are normative, but there are at least two good reasons to doubt this. First, psychological science does not yet offer a good understanding of how often and when eyewitness interviews might deviate from best practice in ways that compromise the accuracy of witnesses' reports. Second, witnesses may frequently be exposed to preinterview influences that could corrupt reports obtained in best-practice interviews.

Truth-tellers stand the test of time and contradict evidence less than liars, even months after a crime.

When deceptive suspects are unaware of the evidence the police hold against them, they contradict that evidence more than truthful suspects do-a useful cue to deception. But given that, over time, truthful suspects might forget the past and also contradict the evidence, how effective are lie detection techniques that rely on such inconsistencies when suspects are questioned months after a crime? In Experiment 1, people committed a theft (liars) or a benign activity (truth-tellers) in a university bookshop. Shortly after or 2 months later, we questioned them about their bookshop visit without informing them of the evidence implicating them in the theft. Though truth-tellers contradicted some evidence after both time delays, liars always contradicted the evidence more than did truth-tellers. In Experiment 2, we presented the mock suspects' responses to an independent group of laypeople and asked them to rate how deceptive the suspects were. Laypeople rated liars as more deceptive than truth-tellers after both time delays, but also rated truth-tellers questioned 2 months after the crime as more deceptive than truth-tellers questioned shortly after the crime. These findings suggest that liars' tendency to distance themselves from a crime might outweigh any memory decay that truth-tellers experience in the 2 months following a crime. As a result, the extent of a suspect's contradictions with the evidence could still be diagnostic of deception even after an extended time delay. (PsycINFO Database Record

Can people identify original and manipulated photos of real-world scenes?

Advances in digital technology mean that the creation of visually compelling photographic fakes is growing at an incredible speed. The prevalence of manipulated photos in our everyday lives invites an important, yet largely unanswered, question: Can people detect photo forgeries? Previous research using simple computer-generated stimuli suggests people are poor at detecting geometrical inconsistencies within a scene. We do not know, however, whether such limitations also apply to real-world scenes that contain common properties that the human visual system is attuned to processing. In two experiments we asked people to detect and locate manipulations within images of real-world scenes. Subjects demonstrated a limited ability to detect original and manipulated images. Furthermore, across both experiments, even when subjects correctly detected manipulated images, they were often unable to locate the manipulation. People's ability to detect manipulated images was positively correlated with the extent of disruption to the underlying structure of the pixels in the photo. We also explored whether manipulation type and individual differences were associated with people's ability to identify manipulations. Taken together, our findings show, for the first time, that people have poor ability to identify whether a real-world image is original or has been manipulated. The results have implications for professionals working with digital images in legal, media, and other domains.

A signal-detection analysis of eyewitness identification across the adult lifespan.

Middle-aged and older adults are frequently victims and witnesses of crime, but knowledge of how identification performance changes over the adult life span is sparse. The authors asked young (18-30 years), middle-aged (31-59 years), and older (60-95 years) adults (N = 2,670) to watch a video of a mock crime and to attempt to identify the culprit from a fair lineup (in which all of the lineup members matched the appearance of the suspect) or an unfair lineup (in which the suspect stood out). They also asked subjects to provide confidence ratings for their identification decisions. To examine identification performance, the authors used a standard response-type analysis, receiver operating characteristic analysis, and signal-detection process modeling. The results revealed that, in fair lineups, aging was associated with a genuine decline in recognition ability-discriminability-and not an increased willingness to choose. Perhaps most strikingly, middle-aged and older adults were generally effective at regulating their confidence judgments to reflect the likely accuracy of their suspect identification decisions. Model-fitting confirmed that the older adults spread their decision criteria such that identifications made with high confidence were likely to be highly accurate, despite the substantial decline in discriminability with age. In unfair lineups, ability to discriminate between innocent and guilty suspects was poor in all age groups. The research enhances theoretical understanding of the ways in which identification behavior changes with age, and has important practical implications for how legal decision-makers should interpret identifications made by middle-aged and older eyewitnesses. (PsycINFO Database Record

Misrepresentations and Flawed Logic About the Prevalence of False Memories.

Brewin and Andrews (2016) propose that just 15% of people, or even fewer, are susceptible to false childhood memories. If this figure were true, then false memories would still be a serious problem. But the figure is higher than 15%. False memories occur even after a few short and low-pressure interviews, and with each successive interview, they become richer, more compelling, and more likely to occur. It is therefore dangerously misleading to claim that the scientific data provide an "upper bound" on susceptibility to memory errors. We also raise concerns about the peer review process.

A mega-analysis of memory reports from eight peer-reviewed false memory implantation studies.

Understanding that suggestive practices can promote false beliefs and false memories for childhood events is important in many settings (e.g., psychotherapeutic, medical, and legal). The generalisability of findings from memory implantation studies has been questioned due to variability in estimates across studies. Such variability is partly due to false memories having been operationalised differently across studies and to differences in memory induction techniques. We explored ways of defining false memory based on memory science and developed a reliable coding system that we applied to reports from eight published implantation studies (N = 423). Independent raters coded transcripts using seven criteria: accepting the suggestion, elaboration beyond the suggestion, imagery, coherence, emotion, memory statements, and not rejecting the suggestion. Using this scheme, 30.4% of cases were classified as false memories and another 23% were classified as having accepted the event to some degree. When the suggestion included self-relevant information, an imagination procedure, and was not accompanied by a photo depicting the event, the memory formation rate was 46.1%. Our research demonstrates a useful procedure for systematically combining data that are not amenable to meta-analysis, and provides the most valid estimate of false memory formation and associated moderating factors within the implantation literature to date.

A robust preference for cheap-and-easy strategies over reliable strategies when verifying personal memories.

People depend on various sources of information when trying to verify their autobiographical memories. Yet recent research shows that people prefer to use cheap-and-easy verification strategies, even when these strategies are not reliable. We examined the robustness of this cheap strategy bias, with scenarios designed to encourage greater emphasis on source reliability. In three experiments, subjects described real (Experiments 1 and 2) or hypothetical (Experiment 3) autobiographical events, and proposed strategies they might use to verify their memories of those events. Subjects also rated the reliability, cost, and the likelihood that they would use each strategy. In line with previous work, we found that the preference for cheap information held when people described how they would verify childhood or recent memories (Experiment 1), personally important or trivial memories (Experiment 2), and even when the consequences of relying on incorrect information could be significant (Experiment 3). Taken together, our findings fit with an account of source monitoring in which the tendency to trust one's own autobiographical memories can discourage people from systematically testing or accepting strong disconfirmatory evidence.

Unfair Lineups Make Witnesses More Likely to Confuse Innocent and Guilty Suspects.

Eyewitness-identification studies have focused on the idea that unfair lineups (i.e., ones in which the police suspect stands out) make witnesses more willing to identify the police suspect. We examined whether unfair lineups also influence subjects' ability to distinguish between innocent and guilty suspects and their ability to judge the accuracy of their identification. In a single experiment (N = 8,925), we compared three fair-lineup techniques used by the police with unfair lineups in which we did nothing to prevent distinctive suspects from standing out. Compared with the fair lineups, doing nothing not only increased subjects' willingness to identify the suspect but also markedly impaired subjects' ability to distinguish between innocent and guilty suspects. Accuracy was also reduced at every level of confidence. These results advance theory on witnesses' identification performance and have important practical implications for how police should construct lineups when suspects have distinctive features.

People consider reliability and cost when verifying their autobiographical memories.

Because memories are not always accurate, people rely on a variety of strategies to verify whether the events that they remember really did occur. Several studies have examined which strategies people tend to use, but none to date has asked why people opt for certain strategies over others. Here we examined the extent to which people's beliefs about the reliability and the cost of different strategies would determine their strategy selection. Subjects described a childhood memory and then suggested strategies they might use to verify the accuracy of that memory. Next, they rated the reliability and cost of each strategy, and the likelihood that they might use it. Reliability and cost each predicted strategy selection, but a combination of the two ratings provided even greater predictive value. Cost was significantly more influential than reliability, which suggests that a tendency to seek and to value "cheap" information more than reliable information could underlie many real-world memory errors.

Delay and déjà vu: timing and repetition increase the power of false evidence.

False images and videos can induce people to believe in and remember events that never happened. Using a novel method, we examined whether the timing of false evidence would influence its effect (Experiment 1) and determined the relationship between timing and repetition (Experiment 2). Subjects completed a hazard perception driving test and were falsely accused of cheating. Some subjects were shown a fake video or photograph of the cheating either after a 9-min delay (Experiment 1) or more than once with or without a delay (Experiment 2). Subjects were more likely to falsely believe that they had cheated and to provide details about how the cheating happened when the false evidence was delayed or repeated-especially when repeated over time-relative to controls. The results show that even a strikingly short delay between an event and when false evidence is disclosed can distort people's beliefs and that repeating false evidence over a brief delay fosters false beliefs more so than without a delay. These findings have theoretical implications for metacognitive models of autobiographical memory and practical implications for police interrogations.

Replicating distinctive facial features in lineups: identification performance in young versus older adults.

Criminal suspects with distinctive facial features, such as tattoos or bruising, may stand out in a police lineup. To prevent suspects from being unfairly identified on the basis of their distinctive feature, the police often manipulate lineup images to ensure that all of the members appear similar. Recent research shows that replicating a distinctive feature across lineup members enhances eyewitness identification performance, relative to removing that feature on the target. In line with this finding, the present study demonstrated that with young adults (n = 60; mean age = 20), replication resulted in more target identifications than did removal in target-present lineups and that replication did not impair performance, relative to removal, in target-absent lineups. Older adults (n = 90; mean age = 74) performed significantly worse than young adults, identifying fewer targets and more foils; moreover, older adults showed a minimal benefit from replication over removal. This pattern is consistent with the associative deficit hypothesis of aging, such that older adults form weaker links between faces and their distinctive features. Although replication did not produce much benefit over removal for older adults, it was not detrimental to their performance. Therefore, the results suggest that replication may not be as beneficial to older adults as it is to young adults and demonstrate a new practical implication of age-related associative deficits in memory.